

THE EDUCATIONAL RELATIONSHIP IS A CONCEPT WITH OWN MEANING, CONNECTED WITH THE CHARACTER OF EDUCATION, AND IT REQUIRES AGREEMENT BETWEEN VALUES AND FEELINGS IN EACH INTERACTION¹

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1. Introduction

Herbart demands the specialised pedagogical approach for educators, under the idea of a “visual circle of their own” which he builds through Pedagogy, something that, in his own words, most educators completely forget to form before devoting themselves to this task. Herbart tells us: “Most of those who educate entirely forget to form a visual circle of their own before devoting themselves to this task; it arises little by little in their work (...), if a child was really able to develop in this way, we should be pleased about it” (Herbart, 1806, p. 1). In contrast to this type of performance, Herbart wants to build a kind of knowledge which provides him with reasons to establish why educators have to keep on acting in the way they do, or why they should change it: “A 90-year-old school teacher in a small village has the experience of his 90-year-old routine; he has the feeling of his long struggles, but does he also have the criticism of his method and his acts?” (Herbart, 1806, p. 5).

The science of education in Herbart implies using data; but theory must be built with functional autonomy, because data are interpreted from a conceptual framework with a meaning which is intrinsic to ‘education’: “What pedagogy has to do is to deliberate on its own concepts and cultivate *independent thought*. In this way it would become the centre of a circle of researches and would not run the risk of being ruled by a foreigner as if it was a distant conquered province” (Herbart, 1806, p. 8. The italics are mine).

This work is not a reflection on what specialists of other disciplines say about the educational relationship. Their analyses are necessary, but neither they use up the content of the educational field, nor I want to live as an apprentice of what they say (Goodwin, 1994). We resort to a science when we have a specific problem about it, which, depending on the case, will be a medical, sociological, psychological problem, or a different one. Every discipline with functional autonomy focuses on the reality which it studies generating the specific mentality of that discipline, which has to be externalised as the

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specialised approach of that discipline towards its object of study and intervention. Pedagogy, as an academically consolidated discipline, advances in the development of the continuum “current of knowledge-substantive discipline-focalization-specific mentality-specialised approach-discourse-pedagogical intervention” (Tourinán and Sáez, 2012). As I have been able to justify in a recent work, this continuum appears in all the consolidated sciences and, in our case, which is the study and analysis of education, it enables us to obtain answers based on the structural elements of intervention (knowledge, function, profession, relation, agents, processes, product and means) (Tourinán, 2014a).

From the perspective of the theory-practice relationship, the mental representation of the educational action, which is the specific pedagogical mentality, *works either as a research presupposition in Pedagogy or as an assumption and it determines the signification and validity of a way of singular thought for the pedagogical function, the profession, the educational relationship and for the knowledge of education itself*. The pedagogical mentality cannot be understood without making reference to these four components because they specify it in each action, and they cannot be understood in the discourse or in the intervention which they generate without making reference to mentality, since they would stop being specified with signification and validity. That is precisely why we can say that they are structural components of mentality. The pedagogical mentality determines the way of specifically pedagogical thought for these four elements.

The *pedagogical approach* is the visual circle that pedagogues do of their performance; it is the mental representation that professionals do of their performance as pedagogical; it is the expression of the critical vision which pedagogues have of their method and their acts. It involves the total pedagogical vision, adjusted to the structural elements of intervention, which are the four structural components of mentality (knowledge, function, profession and relationship) and the four structural components of action (agents, processes, products and means). The specific pedagogical mentality and the specialised pedagogical approach converge in *the pedagogical intervention*, which is defined as the intentional action that we develop in the educational task in order to achieve with, through and for the educatee the means and ends which are justified on the basis of the knowledge of education.

Within the “current-discipline-focalisation-mentality-approach-discourse-intervention” continuum, every discipline with functional autonomy focuses on the reality which it studies, generating the specific mentality of that discipline, which has to be externalised as the specialised approach of that discipline towards its object of study and intervention.

In each specific pedagogical action we move from thought to action; the double condition of field of knowledge and action arises for every intervention. The specific mentality and the specialised approach are representations (knowledge); the intervention is the action. Keeping these distinctions is a demand to reach *the concrete educational action* and its control by means of the *programmed educational action*.

The educational terms have acquired a meaning of their own on the basis of the knowledge of education, in such a way that the educational relationship is not only a moral relationship or a relationship of care, coexistence and communication any more, but the substantive way of intervention adjusted to the traits of character which determine the meaning of ‘education’ in its real definition (Tourinán, 2013b and 2014b).

From the knowledge of education perspective, we must think about the educational relationship as a way of singular and distinct interaction, whose meaning does not depend on our associating it with terms validated through other disciplinary fields. The same activities that we carry out to educate are done for many other things, so activities do

not identify the educational action. In education we coexist, communicate and care, but educating is not each of these things separately or all of them together. Any type of influence is not education, but it can turn into a process of educational influence, as long as we adjust it to the purpose of educating and to the criteria of meaning of educating.

In this article we are going to work on three proposals:

- The educational relationship is a concept with a meaning of its own and it is different because of its purpose and meaning.
- Caring, coexisting and communicating are necessary conditions, but not enough, of the educational relationship.
- The educational relationship demands agreement between values and feelings in each "mise-en-scène" and it is a way of committed and non-neutral performance, adjusted to the traits of character which determine the meaning of 'education'.

2. The educational relationship is distinct because it assumes the criteria of common use and purpose in its meaning

In the VIII national Conference on Pedagogy, which we organised with the Spanish Society of Pedagogy in Santiago de Compostela in 1984, professor E. B. Page, president of AERA, gave a lecture in which he made reference to what specialists in a field feel when they are called to another field or to what they feel when everything from a field of knowledge is solved by postulates and achievements from another field. As if doctors, sociologists, experimental analysts or psychologists could use up the content of education (Page, 1984).


The applied vision of the educational relationship is the vision of the interpretative theories. As professor González Álvarez said in his classic book "Philosophy of education", interpretative theories are *special treatises* on the generating disciplines. They are applications of the concepts of generating disciplines such as Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, and so on to education. These theories are not treatises on special Psychology or special Sociology, etc., but special treatises on Psychology, Sociology, etc. What is specialised is the task, but not the discipline, because the discipline is always, in this case of interpretative theories, the same generating discipline - Psychology, Anthropology, Biology, Sociology, et cetera, as appropriate- (González Álvarez, 1977, p. 20).

We speak about General and Applied Sociology; General and Applied Economics; General and Applied Biology; we also speak about Psychology, Medicine, Anthropology and other autonomous disciplines in the same way. However, when we find that autonomous discipline and apply it to the interpretation of another field, according to González Álvarez, we are saying that the applied disciplines specialise the task, but not the discipline; they are Sociology, Psychology, and so forth (González Álvarez, 1977). Educational Psychology, Work Psychology, Educational Sociology, etc., specialise the task, but not the discipline; they are and they apply Sociology, Psychology, etc., to different fields; they are applied disciplines. In Pedagogy, we also find applied pedagogies (work, family, general education, professional education, adult education Pedagogy and others) that specialise the task, but not the discipline (Touriñán and Sáez, 2012, cap. 7). Nevertheless this does not use up Pedagogy or nullifies the sense of Pedagogy as a discipline with functional autonomy through concepts which have a signification intrinsic to the field (Touriñán, 2014a).

We can speak about Psychology of the educational relationship, about Sociology of relationship and so on, but after applying the analysis of Psychology, Sociology etc., we would always ask ourselves why that relationship is educational. We can ask that question

with the same legitimacy as we ask why the educational relationship is a psychological relationship from a certain perspective or a sociological relationship from another one, et cetera. We have to speak about educational relationship from the pedagogical perspective and face the challenge of solving the relationship through the characteristic concepts of education. From the perspective of the common use of the term and the activities performed when educating, distinguishing any other type of influence and educational influences demands the pedagogical assessment of different ways of behaviour, taking into account the purpose criterion. Coexisting is not educating, as there are types of coexistence that are not specified or qualified as educational. Communicating is not educating, since communication is always a physical and symbolic process whose purpose is to elucidate the message which the speaker aims at and the speaker does not always aim at education. Caring is not educating because at times we care to cure somebody and other times we care to educate and both actions have a different meaning. Knowing a cultural area is not teaching, as knowledge can be separated from action; and teaching is not educating because we can affirm that there are some types of teaching which do not educate, and we can say the same about any other activity. In the educational relationship it is necessary to communicate, but communicating is not enough to educate. In the educational relationship it is necessary to coexist, but coexisting is not enough to educate. In the educational relationship it is necessary to care, but caring is not enough to educate. In the educational relationship we teach, but teaching is not enough to educate. They all are necessary conditions, but not enough to characterise the educational relationship, as summarised in Chart 1.

Chart 1: The educational relationship adjusts to the meaning of educating



Source: Touriñán, 2014b, p. 100.

The educational relationship is considered as such, *as long as the criteria of common use of the term 'education' are fulfilled and the purpose to educate is preserved*, otherwise it will be any other type of relationship. The educational relationship needs the synonymic definition, but it must be analysed through its own traits, as it corresponds to the real definition of any term. This demands to go beyond the criterion of common use of the term and the criterion of activity as a purpose so as to understand the distinctive traits that determine its real meaning in each educational act.

It must be clear from the start that, if we can speak about the educational relationship, it is because the relationship fulfils the criteria of common use of the term 'education', which are identified as a criterion of content, form, use and balance:

- a. The educational relationship is considered as such because it obeys a criterion of content: those processes in which we learn something which is against moral values are not described as educational, and this means that only the learning of morally irreproachable contents is described as educational. Defending something as educational, involves a moral judgement about the content which is used. If this is not achieved, we are simply in process of communication, teaching and learning.
- b. The educational relationship is considered as such because it obeys a criterion of form: acting on educatees without respecting their freedom or dignity as persons is not considered educational. The educational process has to respect the educatees' dignity and freedom, because they are also the agents of their own development. If we do not achieve this, we are in process of instrumentalisation.
- c. The educational relationship is considered as such because it obeys a criterion of formative use: those kinds of learning in which educatees repeat something that they do not understand and that they do not know how to use are not described as educational. The educational process has to make it possible for educatees to develop some type of conceptual diagram of their own about what is being communicated. If this is not achieved, we are only in process of instruction, training and memory dexterity.
- d. The educational relationship is considered as such because it obeys a criterion of balance: talking about education demands the achievement of an integrated personality, avoiding situations in which the excessive or unilateral development of one of the areas of experience generates unbalanced men and women. The educational process always demands balanced results. If we do not achieve this, we are not talking about general formation, we are in process of specialised formation.

In the field of the knowledge of education, the application of these criteria lets us not confuse education with any other type of influence. Any type of influence is not education, otherwise influencing people to stop them from doing what they have to do to be educated would also be education.

The fact that any type of influence is not education does not nullify or invalidate the possibility to turn any type of influence into an educational process. Logically, nothing prevents educatees, by themselves and from the experience that others communicate them (self-education process) or by means of the experiences which others communicate them (hetero-education processes), from being able to analyse that negative influence with a criterion based on the educational knowledge and from being able to turn it into a process of educational influence. It is not educational to manipulate or transmit as true the knowledge of a cultural area which the theoretical investigation of the area proves to be

false. However, it is indeed educational to unmask manipulation and to use false knowledge to prove its error and exercise skills of use of the theoretical proof criteria.

In my opinion the criteria of common use language qualify the activity which we perform as education in a singular way. We can affirm that distinguishing any other type of influence and educational influences demands the pedagogical assessment of different ways of behaviour, taking into account the criterion of language use and purpose.

From the perspective of purpose, education is a value, since purpose is a value which is chosen. As a value, the fundamental aim of *education as a task*, is the development of skills, habits, attitudes and knowledge which qualify people to be, move, intervene, act, learn and interrelate with values, because it is a question of building axiological experience. From that same perspective, the main aim of *education as a result* is the acquisition of a series of behaviours which qualify educatees to decide and develop their personal life project by using the axiological experience in order to give an answer to the demands that may arise in each situation according to the opportunities. Concerning performance, the aim is to use the axiological experience as an instrument of self-construction and formation: it is basically an activity oriented to construct oneself and recognise oneself with the other person in a diverse cultural environment of interaction by means of values (Touriñán, 2014to).

If this is like this, and from a descriptive or expositive perspective which bears in mind the activities previously mentioned, it is understood that education is the development of the general dimensions of intervention and the adjusted competencies, the specific capacities and the basic dispositions of each educatee for the achievement of knowledge, skills-abilities, attitudes and habits related to the aims of education and to the guiding values derived from these aims in each internal and external activity, and using the internal and external means suitable for each activity.

We try to make educatees acquire knowledge, attitudes and skills-abilities which qualify them to decide and to perform their projects by giving an answer to the demands which arise in each situation according to the opportunities, from every internal activity: think, feel affectively, have feelings, want, choose-do (operate), decide-act (project) and create (build by means of symbols) and from every external activity (game, work, study, profession, investigation and relationship). Fulfilling these criteria of content, form, use and balance and fulfilling the purpose of education make the educational relationship not be confused with any other type of activity and make a relationship not be considered simply as educational because it performs an activity.

3. The educational relationship is not only coexisting

In common language there is a connection between “coexistence” and “living with” which does not hide the deep differences in the use of both terms; differences which are evident in the question: Who do you live with? In effect, we coexist with relatives, with our group of friends, with members of a club or association, with citizens, with neighbours, et cetera. We do some things but not others with each of these groups of people with whom we coexist. For this reason, a teenager can lend money to a friend, but not to any of his/her schoolmates. However, I actually “live with” my parents or with my wife or with my wife and children, etc. We coexist in a lot of fields and from the point of view of education, there are coexistence spaces, fields or sectors. There are also coexistence levels, as coexistence is not the same in all of them, and the coexistence level among those who are in the same coexistential space is not the same, either. “Living with” is not exactly the same as “coexisting”. Pedagogy asks questions about these differences and the school educates in a coexistence atmosphere. It is necessary to qualify coexistence, because the key point in education for coexistence is what we are ready to

assume. Coexistence has to be specified because each space specifies coexistence, taking into account the particular conditions of that space. The coexistence relationship is a relationship of identity and interaction of identities (among people, or also with animals or things) with any appropriate qualification and specification (Tourinán, Dir., 2012; Peiró, 2012; Pinker, 2012).

In relation to education, coexistence is a qualified and specified proposal. Education for coexistence involves assuming that:

- *It is necessary to qualify coexistence* because the key point in the formation for coexistence is what we are ready to assume. Not all coexistence is equal and there are coexistence levels, concerning oneself and the others. In principle, coexistence is a question of identity and relationship with oneself, with others and with things and it affects the third-generation human rights. If this is like this, education for coexistence is an exercise of education in values oriented to assuming the commitment of the interactive relationship with oneself, the other person and the other thing.
- *It is necessary to specify coexistence*, because coexistence takes place in particular spaces. Formation for coexistence is presented as an exercise of education in values singularised by the pedagogical intervention oriented to building and using axiological experience to act peacefully in relation with oneself, the other person and the other thing in the different convivial spaces.

Forming is not the same as coexisting, and it does not mean educating for coexistence, either. It is necessary for Pedagogy to ask itself about these differences and to form in the diverse coexistence levels, by paying attention to the specificity of the convivial spaces, so as to give education for coexistence the place which it deserves both within social education and within education in general. It is necessary to specify coexistence because it takes place in particular spaces and each space has its distinctive traits which determine coexistence. Besides, it is necessary to qualify coexistence, since the key point in education for coexistence is what we are ready to assume. Coexistence is not anything.

Understanding that coexistence as a concept, and without any other type of qualification, has an inverse relationship with the concept of *violence*, as if they had the same causes but in the opposite sense, involves attributing erroneously the quality of conceptual (logical) connection to an empirical connection between two terms. It is true that violence takes place in spaces which are typical of or appropriate for the practice and the exercise of coexistence; this is the evidence of an empirical connection between both concepts. Apart from this, there is no conceptual connection, because we also have the irrefutable evidence that groups who were ethnically, ideologically or socially identified show strong bonds and coexistence and solidarity practices among them, but at the same time they behave violently with other members or groups in shared environments. We all have proof of this type of empirical “coexistence-violence” connection and evidence of the non-conceptual connection between both concepts in violent behaviours between two groups of friends confronted in a disco, between two families confronted by an inheritance, in confrontations among fundamentalist religious, ethnic, political, gangbanger groups etc., or among groups of “supporters” confronted in sports events. In all these cases we detect that there is coexistence inside the group and strong solidarity among its members motivated by the sense of belonging to the group or by the goals which they share. There is coexistence but there is also violence. There is indeed coexistence in the group that acts violently and there is a strong sense of solidarity among

its members. However, this solidarity does not imply equality, or shared value outside the group. It follows from this that coexistence and violence only share an empirical connection. Violence does not correspond logically with the concept of coexistence; it is not a necessary condition.

The empirical (experiential) and non-conceptual character of the coexistence-violence relationship demands to qualify and specify coexistence spaces, so as to understand the convivial school space (classroom, transport, playground, leisure and sport areas, canteens) as a space of pedagogically programmed relationship to educate at certain ages and adjusted to the principles of pedagogical intervention. If this is like this, coexistence has to be qualified and specified, as summarised in Chart 2.

Chart 2: *Qualification and specification of coexistence*



Source: Touriñán, 2014a, p. 334.

The proposal to qualify and specify coexistence affects each individual. In this way, the subject's decision appears as a question of rights and as an axiological and ethically committed question of qualified (intercultural, civic, educational, participatory, etc.) and specified (family, friends, local, civic, etc.) coexistence, founded on the guiding values of dignity, freedom, equality, diversity and development and on the personal qualities of autonomy, responsibility, justice, identity and cooperation. An ethical commitment of personal and institutional wills, which in the particular case of coexistence, is oriented to coexisting in a better world in which education is increasingly the effective instrument of transformation and adaptation of man as a world, but located citizen.

It is true that certain values which are necessary to reach coexistence are strengthened in each convivial space. Values of autonomy, responsibility, self-esteem, sensitivity, fortitude, discipline, control, sense of privacy, et cetera are strengthened in *coexistence with oneself*. Values linked to deference, respect, reciprocity, confidence,

generosity, empathy, and so on will be preferably strengthened in *coexistence with friends*. *Work-related* coexistence will strengthen values linked to loyalty, sincerity, respect, courtesy, collaboration, fulfilment, initiative and participation as the basis of the relationship. *Family-related coexistence* will strengthen values linked to identity, diversity, difference, equality, esteem, recognition, complementarity, protection, care, devotion, obedience, availability, affectivity, and so forth. *Coexistence with things* will especially strengthen values related to property, the nature of things and connections with the environment. We are discovering so many therapeutic and formative possibilities in *coexistence with animals* that I could only highlight specifiable genuine values such as identity, affectivity, reciprocity and responsibility.

Anyway, it is also certain that in any coexistence space we can prove that there is nothing in the human being's rights that is opposed to the recognition of the place which corresponds to oneself, the other person and the other thing. Man's rights must strengthen the meaning of the human condition and its identity in a diverse cultural setting of interaction. Thus, coexistence relationship is a relationship of identity and interaction of identities (among people, or also with animals or things) with any qualification and specification appropriate to the concept and which we are ready to assume.

Understanding coexistence relationship as *a relationship of identity and interaction of identities* in which there may be a conflict is an exercise of education in values oriented to assuming the commitment of the interactive relationship with oneself, with the other person and the other thing. The existence of conflict makes the *mediation relationship*, together with the *educational relationship*, have pedagogical sense. It is a new pedagogical function which we have to protect and develop appropriately.

Mediation implies a midpoint between two situations and its aim is to make the two parties involved in the conflict reach a midpoint which leads to the conflict resolution. The possibility of mediation is likely in all the spheres of the relationship life, since the possibility of conflict is likely in all of them. At present, the mediating function has been regularised in some fields and it has even professionalised; today we can already talk about family, working, judicial, etc. mediation in a professional sense.


Mediation opts for the culture of communication, because it promotes encounter and provides opportunities so that people may find the possible solutions to their conflicts by themselves. This is a conceptual difference in relation to *arbitration*, in which there is always a decision which forces parties when they do not agree (SI(e)TE, 2010). The aim of mediation is that those who are interested may reach an agreement and, in that case, they may re-establish the relationship and reduce hostility. For this purpose, the mediator encourages proposals and solutions and promotes processes of respect among interlocutors. It is not a question of denying that there are conflicts, but a question of being able to pose, face and solve them if possible, without limiting the alternatives of intervention to the classic ways to discipline students.

Mediation cannot be confused with a therapy, or with a juridical performance (one cannot be a mediator and a lawyer of one of the parties), or with the act of *conciliation* before a magistrate. Mediation precisely tries to avoid appealing to courts to solve a dispute, as it is the case of mediation between consumers and manufacturers, among neighbours of a community, et cetera.

The people who make use of mediation do not have the power of decision or persuasion. They do not impose, they only encourage and propose; they disappear when the relationships are restored. Their function is to return the control of the conflict to the parties and to help them to regain the necessary confidence to adopt their own decisions. It is necessary to help each party to leave an only partial point of view and to turn them into protagonists of the possible decision about the conflict.

If so, it makes sense to affirm that education has to form in order to know how to face the conflict and to attain qualified and specified coexistence; a type of education that we try summarise in Chart 3:

Chart 3: Concept of education for coexistence



Source: Touriñán, 2014a, p. 335.

In convivial spaces the values derived from the human rights are established as a foundation of education for coexistence, which in principle implies commitment of wills in the interaction with oneself and with the other person and the other thing. This is based on the acceptance of oneself, of the others, as human beings and as dignified and equal beings, and of the other thing as a subject-object of rights in our environment. Only in this way we fulfil the full meaning of education for coexistence as an exercise of education in values oriented to assuming the commitment of interactive relationship with oneself, the other person and the other thing.

From the point of view of the educational relationship, coexistence is a necessary condition, but it is not enough. Coexisting is not enough to establish the educational relationship. Coexistence is an interaction of identities, it is *an interactive relationship with oneself, the other person and the other thing*. It has to be qualified and specified and it cannot be confused with violence, mediation or conciliation and arbitration. All this applies to the educational relationship.

4. The educational relationship is not only communicating

Communication is a symbolic physical process whose purpose is to elucidate the meaning which the communicator aims at. Whether verbal or non-verbal, communication is defined by the relationship in which something is transmitted so that another person can elucidate it (Stewart, 1973). I can transmit without interacting with the other person, but communication is not possible if we do not take into account that it is addressed to another

person (Berlo, 1979; Luft, 1976). Communicating is not only transmitting. Communication has verifiable wide scope and it has made a large part of the human activity possible. However, this has not made it synonymous of education. Firstly, it is absolutely necessary not to forget that educating is not always or necessarily the aim of communication, this is why it is possible to affirm that there is no education without communication, but it is possible to communicate without educating. The experts on communication accept that there is not neutrality of the means of communication and, by accepting that the means is the message (Mcluhan and Powers, 1995), it is more useful to speak about the purpose of communication in terms of the creator's or the receiver's goal, rather than define it as the property of the message itself (Berlo, 1979, p. 9).

Human communication has some defined components that are observed in each particular process: the *source* of communication or person with the aim to communicate (it can be a school headmaster, for example); the encoder or *mediator*, who expresses and transmits the purposes of the source for consumers (it can be the teacher); the *message* or content; the *channel* or means used to transmit; the *decoder*, which refers to the internal and external elements that the receiver has so as to decipher the message (hearing, sight, thought, hearing aids, etc.) and the *receiver* of communication, the person who receives the message and acts accordingly (Berlo, 1979, p. 25).

This description of the communication process can become bigger from the point of view of Psychology under the form of stimulus and answer and feedback, and also from the point of view of acceptance or non-acceptance of the meaning of the message at which the sender aims. In any case, there will always be a place for the question about what makes a communication be educational or not.

Regarding the educational relationship, what we want to highlight most about the concept of communication is not the process in itself or the content, since education deals with these conditions with its own criterion. When we speak about educating, all communication is a mediated process of teaching. Teaching implies showing something by means of signs and making somebody know something by means of a method, whether it is of a theoretical or practical nature. Teaching involves arranging the elements that take part in the process of making someone know for a particular space and time, so that the teacher and the student will know which changes they want to achieve, how they will manage to achieve them and what they would have to do if they did not achieve them. In this way, the process of communicating integrates into another process with its own singularity in the field of education: the teaching process, which will be educational if it fulfils the criteria of nominal and real definition characteristic of the term 'education'.

Concerning the educational relationship, we are also interested in highlighting the perspective of personal communication which is included in the concept of communication, as well. Contrary to what some people think, communicating is not always communication between two persons or between a person and a group or between groups. Communication is basically, communication with oneself. As well as coexistence is qualified and specified, communication is also qualified and specified: from verbal to non-verbal communication, from self-communication to hetero communication, from process to result, from subject to object, from content to communication techniques, from *existential communication* to educational communication, etc. (Redondo, 1999, cap. 9).

Free existential communication, which is a concept analysed by Jaspers, reflects the most basic sense of personal communication (Millán Puelles, 1951; Round, 1999, cap. 7; Campillo, Esteve, Ibáñez-Martín and Touriñán, 1974; Gusdorf, 1973). The free communication of existences is a straightforward dialogue in which each one opens the doors of his/her privacy wide to the other person, respecting his/her freedom and abstaining from exerting the least directive influence. Existential communication means


that both persons are at the same level of equality; equality is not understood as an arithmetical equivalence, but as the full acceptance of the other person, by promising to accept him/her as oneself, as a subject, like me (Redondo 1999, p. 146). Existential communication is the expression of the need for communication and its deepest contradiction, since “while I have to affirm and defend my freedom in front of the other and stand out from him/her, I can only do this task by embracing him/her. Neither the others nor I can do by ourselves what each one wants to do for him/herself: I need them in order to be myself, and they need me in order to be themselves” (Redondo, 1999, p. 135).

Existential communication is never educational communication because the former does not admit directive relationship from one to the other, but equality of subjects who communicate as adults so as to transmit something. From the human point of view, what characterises personal communication is the implication relationship of one with oneself or with another person or others, or also with an object, in such a way that we are donating something in this contact. It must be clear that donation in existential communication is not a material and interested donation, but a donation which does not involve the deprivation of what is given. Therefore donation, or transmission of material objects, is not communication. Strictly speaking, communication applies to immaterial realities or to the mental and spiritual participation of symbols and meanings, although its results may change material things, relationships and all sorts of realities (Redondo, 1999, p. 179).

From the point of view of the educational relationship, communication is not education, or material donation, but the relationship with oneself, with others, or with things, as a participation that fulfils two conditions: 1) the contact and 2) the donation that one of them makes to the other (or to oneself for self-communication). The absence of one of these two conditions would be enough to destroy communication (Redondo, 1999, p. 210). The one who communicates something, does not lose what s/he communicates in the donation, the teacher does not use up by losing what s/he communicates; a magazine article does not decrease despite the times that we read it or apprehend its content.

Finally, I think it is necessary to emphasize another fundamental aspect of personal communication. It is the consciousness of what we share in the contact. This is a question which we do not usually consider from the point of view of education, but which is especially significant when managing affections. Luft refers to this problem as the pattern of the four quadrants (Open, Blind, Hidden and Unknown) which represent the person in his/her relation with other people, as detailed in Chart 4

Chart 4: Quadrants which represent the person in relation to other people



Source: Luft, 1976, p. 24.

From the communication point of view, the interaction of the quadrants leads to the following remarks:

- A change in any quadrant will affect all the others.
- The smaller the first (“Open”) quadrant is, the poorer the communication.
- There is a universal curiosity on the fourth area, “Unknown”, but it is usually repressed by social uses and habits and by fears.
- Interpersonal learning means that there has been a change that increases the area of the first quadrant and reduces one or more of the other three quadrants.
- Knowing how to appreciate and respect the hidden aspects in quadrants 2, 3 and 4, has to do with affective education.

In *the communication relationship* the interaction among people leads to *three categories*: expounding, proposing and imposing. *Expounding*, *proposing* and *imposing* are key concepts in the educational relationship, born from communication and applicable to relationships between peers and to asymmetric relationships. When one expounds, there are only two possible actions for the interlocutor if interested attention is attained: either s/he understands what has been expounded, or s/he does not. When someone proposes, there are two possible actions for the interlocutor from the commitment perspective: s/he either accepts or refuses it. When someone imposes, there are two possible actions for the interlocutor from the power perspective: s/he either submits to it or rebels against it.

It is undeniable that the educational relationship is beyond mere existential communication and it is also undeniable that the educational relationship is neither a relationship between two adult subjects who try to influence mutually, nor a relationship between a subject and an object which is handled at will. The communicative relationship is a relationship in which we share, we get in touch and make a donation and, the same as in coexistence relationship, we manage spaces and affections. All this is applied to the educational relationship, but this does not make communication be defined as educational. Communication is necessary, but it is not enough for the educational relationship. Every educational relationship is a coexistence and communication relationship, but not any coexistence or communication relationship is simply an educational relationship. It is necessary to move forward and also understand the limits which the relationship of

“caring and educating” fits within, a type of relationship -that of caring- which demands the effective existence of a directive relationship, but which is not education in itself, either.

5. The educational relationship is not only caring

In the purest sense of the pedagogical tradition caring and educating have always been associated, with the conviction that the limits of education would be established in that alliance, against technical and political action (Millán Puelles, 1951; Round, 1999; Campillo, Esteve, Ibáñez-Martín and Touriñán, 1974):

- *Technical action* is understood in this case as the interaction of a subject with an object that s/he handles at will (or with another subject, that is treated as an object), within a programme of means-aims relationship.
- *Political action* is understood as the interaction of an adult subject with another adult subject concerning a project or aim which is the general interest, the common good or each subject's interest, with the intention of influencing mutually concerning that project or aim.
- The action that corresponds to *caring* and *educating* is a peculiar relationship through which I treat individuals, who are in a dependent relationship of care and education with me, as the aim of my intervention and I aim my action and theirs at the goal of curing or educating them.

However, after having said that, it must be clear that the educational relationship is not only caring, because caring is not educating: we distinguish between the expressions “*caring to cure*” and “*caring to educate*”. When a doctor ‘looks’ at a body, his/her specialised approach sees the person from the perspective of anatomy, physiology and the pathology which justifies his/her clinical intervention (diagnosis, prognosis and performance project). This is what happens in every science because every time it acts, it has defined its problem of intervention. It is the pedagogue's duty to define and delimit this problem of intervention with specific mentality and specialised approach.

Care is a concept which has been widening from the maternal pattern to other caring needs. From its origin in the maternal relationship, care has been widening up to the learning of social behaviour. However, there is a border between caring and educating between “*assisting*” and “*educational*”, which the laws themselves do not have to obviate at the risk of mixing up the contexts and actions of health and education (Tobío, Agulló, Gómez and Martín, 2010, p. 52). For us it is clear that the Ministry of Health is not the Ministry of Education, although it is necessary to care in both cases (curing and educating).

We assume that assisting and educational are not the same and that the concept of caring is applied to people, animals and things, whereas educating is only applied to people.

If we say with appropriate meaning that we *care to cure* and we *care to educate*, and say that caring is the same in both cases, we would be logically saying, that two things equal to a third are equal to each other and, therefore, curing and educating would mean the same, concerning care. The truth is that the cares that we perform to cure and the cares that we perform to educate are not the same, although in both cases we use the concept of care as attention in a moral sense. Caring, curing and educating do not mean the same.

Even if we affirm that caring is not the same as educating, it is also fair to admit that there are questions in the concept of care which force us to make the educational relationship more precise, because the care relationship arises in the educational relationship as attention in a moral sense.

The educational relationship is not only hetero-education, it is also self-education, relationship of one with oneself. The care among people, the same as education, is a relationship of one with oneself and it is an interaction or encounter between two human beings, in which both sides of the relationship -the one who cares and the one who is cared for- play a role; one gives and the other receives, and these two roles are exchanged in different moments of the relationship (Noddings, 1992, p. 30).

Care relationships among people are characterised by a genuine interest in oneself and the other person's welfare, which is reflected in attitudes and actions in which a reciprocal search of welfare is experienced and built. The intersubjective relationship of care is built in respectful interactions of attention and it pays attention to mutual needs. When I observe somebody attentively and I identify that they need something and give it to them -for example, when some students need to understand an instruction better, they are allowed to ask and they are given an answer appropriate to their anxiety-, the care relationship is only completed, when those people show that they have received what I gave them (in our example the students receive and accept the explanation). It is a fact that fostering care relationships involves necessarily building a community among all of us and it is also a fact that the reciprocity in the recognition and the attention create bonds that make it possible to develop interest in the common good and to create consciousness about how everyone's actions affect the others (Daza, 2009; Noddings, 2002, pp. 18-28).

The accomplishment of the ethics of care implies a change in perspective regarding the handling of discipline at school, going from negative to positive. *Justice* and *caring* (understood as attention in a moral sense), two concepts which are the title of the work by Katz, Noddings and Strike (2002), constitute a pair of alternatives that are part of the relationship of help among people. In this work we do not try to offer a summary of ethics applied to education from the ethics of care perspective, however we must say that it is much more enriching than the adjustment of the teacher's action to the codes of professional ethics, since they do not generate the professional's moral commitment by the fact of being formulated: formulating the code in order to accomplish it and act in accordance with it is not enough (Tourinán, 2013a).

The ethics of care takes us to a new perspective of alterity and deference, that is, of the affective relationship, from the point of view of suffering and the acceptance of the other, since it is unquestionable that at times in education our students suffer with our intervention and other times we make them suffer; but sometimes they also enjoy themselves with our work and with theirs and they feel satisfied and happy:

“Attention as a moral orientation requires receptivity, a shift in motivations (the person's energy should be channelled to the projects or the needs of the person who is being attended) and complete fulfilment in the person being attended. Any politics that excludes this interaction systematically can be *ipso facto* considered contrary to the concept of attention” (Noddings, 2002, p.25)

However, concerning this exposition, it is enough to confirm that in terms of moral education, the ethics of care has contributed to widen the analysis perspectives of the moral stages defined by Piaget or Kohlberg and to give the character of universal value to caring (attention and assistance in a moral sense). We must emphasize that neither care is a trait of character univocally defined in a biological way, nor the affectivity assessment and the attention to the other constitute a feminine inferiority that underestimates the importance and value of care in education (Beauchamps and Childress, 1979; Kemp, 2000; Gilligan, 1982; Nussbaum, 2002).

After saying this, we take it for granted that the educational relationship, as well as the care relationship among people must reconcile two demands: the purpose of the

interaction, which in a way turns the other or oneself into the object of action, and the condition of subject of the person who we interact with (Esteve, 2010). However, neither the aims nor the intervention are the same when we care to educate and when we care to cure, even if there is an affective and directive relationship of trust and obedience in both cases; that is to say, a relationship of care, of attention in the moral sense, which has always been analysed as an *authority relationship* in the most classic tradition of Pedagogy (Touriñán, 2013a)

In other works I have defended the educator's institutionalised authority as a principle of pedagogical intervention (Touriñán, 2014a). That is precisely why I assume that the directive relationship must be an authority relationship in every asymmetrical directive relationship in which there is a leader. Every directive relationship is a relationship of authority, but authority is sometimes understood only as power and not as prestige and gained recognition. "Authority" is applied to every directive relationship in which we have to lead situations, projects and groups regarding the tasks of its concern. The connection between authority and directive relationship is conceptual, not empirical. There is no directive relationship without authority and there is no authority without directive relationship. That is why we can say that authority is a directive relationship and that the directive relationship is a relationship of authority. It is not a particular and exclusive condition of the teaching relationship or of the educational relationship. Authority as a principle is related to the professions that provide the condition of expert in the management of projects and personal interaction.

In the directive relationships of care and education in particular, the condition of directive relationship of authority, regarded as prestige and gained recognition, is understood as a directive asymmetrical relationship. In these cases, the relationship of authority as gained prestige is defined as a directive relationship based on the trust that a person gives to another in order to lead his/her conducts in a specific field of his/her existence. This authority is part of the teacher's institutionally recognised authority as a professional and in certain conditions it is compatible with the additional meaning of authority as a public official.

Caring and educating are two ways of interaction that require a directive relationship. By assuming that not every directive relationship is a relationship of care or education, we can affirm that in the relationship of care and education we require authority as recognition and gained prestige. We have to act in a special way to get the other to change and act, but without forgetting that the educational relationship is not the same as authority relationship. Although the authority relationship appears when caring and educating, that does not make them equal. The care relationship is not simply an educational relationship because it is different to say "we care to cure and we care to educate" but the care relationship makes education pay attention to several conditions:

- The subject condition of the person with whom we interact.
- The purpose of the interaction, which somehow turns the other or oneself into an action object.
- The concept of *attention and assistance* as a moral demand regarding the subject with whom we interact.
- The directive character of the relationship, since we act following an established or programmed plan of care or education with a subject that is not at the same level; s/he needs help, direction and cares.
- The sense of directive relationship as an authority relationship.
- The sense of responsibility with oneself and "with the other" in the interaction, which is a situated responsibility because it tries to answer the demands of the other who is situated (well or badly, but situated); it is

also asymmetrical because s/he is not my equal in the relationship and because I take responsibility for the other and do not expect reciprocity. The educatee subject and the cared-for subject will answer in front of me, who educate or care for them, depending on the case, but neither of them takes responsibility for me. (Minguez, 2012; Ortega, 2014; Arboleda, 2014).

At the starting point, education, as a situated responsibility, appears as a shared and derived responsibility. It is shared because we all are object of education and not everybody has the same functions in it. It is derived because the responsibility and obligation to educate arise from the recognition of the human condition itself and of the society as a factor of educational development, from the ethical basis of democracy, from the educational value of legislation and from education as a factor of social development. We have dealt with these points in other works (Tourrián (Dir.), 2008a, 2008b and 2012), so now it is enough to state that situated responsibility means that it is an educational responsibility which is shared by the different educational agents (it affects all educational agents, from oneself and the family, to the school, society and the state) and a responsibility derived from education which starts from the individual, social, historical and species-being human condition. It materialises in the recognition of the right "to" and "of" education in each legally established territorial framework.

In conclusion, care as moral attention, as well as justice, is part of the educational relationship and of education. They are necessary conditions, but not enough to make an interaction be educational. The educational relationship is "educational" because it aims at educating and it adjusts to the meaning of that action. Nevertheless, coexisting, communicating and caring are relationships prior to the educational relationship and they establish conditions which are necessary but not sufficient.

6. The educational relationship is a relationship and it is not solved in antinomic pairs: freedom and education do not exclude each other and are co-involved in the educational relationship

The common use of the term education helps us to form the concept, so we are able to discern what educating is from what it looks like. The analysis of the activities helps us to specify more: not only do we discern (know its aspect and configuration), but we advance towards the definition of the typical traits of education. Apart from knowing that something is education, it is necessary to be able to say what education is. We have to know what a thing is unlike another thing that "is", as well. The analysis of the activities allows us to state that the activities which we perform in education are not those which determine real meaning. The same activities that we perform to educate are used for many other tasks. There are criteria of use of the term which allow us to discern, but we only reach the sphere of the real definition if we go deeper into the traits that characterise the thing to be defined.

In the field of knowledge of education and from the perspective of educational relationship, we can state that the activities which we carry out do not determine meaning. The same activities that we perform to educate are done for many other things, so activities do not identify action. In education we teach, coexist, communicate and care, but educating is not each of those things separately or all of them together. Nothing previously mentioned nullifies the fact that education is a field of reality susceptible of being known in different ways, in which we take technical, moral and political decisions; a field which may be analysed through the epistemological levels of theory, technology and practice. A

field in which the relationship is also with oneself and not only with another person or another thing; a field in which the relationship between communicating, coexisting, caring and educating cannot make us forget that they are not the same.

In the presentation text of the international conference on Philosophy of Education held in Madrid in June, 2012, Professor Ibáñez-Martín, confronted us with the central problem of the purpose, by focusing on the cares which we must carry out to educate: it is more and more important to reconsider a kind of education which is substantially oriented towards the care for the human being's integral development; the educatee's promotion of freedom must prevent the educator's action from being an imposition which intends to influence others according to personal criteria; and the fulfilment of those who take part in the educational process must not be understood from an individualist perspective, but from a solidary one, by knowing how to empathically worry about the others' care (Ibáñez-Martín, 2013).

Regarding what we have said, it makes sense to affirm that the *educational relationship is, generically, relationship*. Relationship is one of the Aristotelian categories (Ferrater, 1980). It refers to what is relative, which is defined as the reference from one thing to another in a numerical, non-numerical, determined, non-determined, active or passive way. The concept of relationship also refers to categories inferred from judgements and in this sense we speak in Kantian terms about causality and dependence relationship and about relationships of community or reciprocity of action between the agent and the recipient. Besides, in contemporary thought, we can speak about relationships as a connection among facts attached to two or more objects and in this way we talk about relationship of equality, cause-effect, from biggest to smallest and of means-aims. The relationship of human encounter is one of the specific ways of relationship. It is an interpersonal relationship in which we can integrate the relationships of caring, communicating, coexisting, educating, et cetera. We have to distinguish their symmetrical, reciprocal or transitivity sense, as well as their sense of relationship from one to many, from many to one, from one to one and from one to oneself (Menne, 1976).

Following the order of our previous reasoning, we can also say that the *educational relationship is specifically educational*. It is educational as it fulfils all the conditions of [use of common language](#) which we have specified and the purpose conditions, different from other specified activities like caring, coexisting and communicating. Thus, the educational relationship, apart from being a "relationship", is educational because it fulfils the criteria of content, form, use and balance. It is a relationship that cannot be confused with coexisting, communicating or caring. It is not each of these things separately, or all of them together, but all of them are necessary conditions for the educational relationship and determine the features which must be assumed by it:

- The same as coexistence, the educational relationship is an interaction of identities, an *interactive relationship with oneself, the other person and the other thing*. It has to be qualified and specified and it is not confused with violence, mediation or conciliation or arbitration.
- The same as communication, the educational relationship is not pure existential communication, or technical action with objects, or political action among equal subjects. Just as in communication, the educational relationship is a relationship in which we share, we get in touch, we make a donation and we even manage spaces and affections.
- The same as in the relationship of caring, the educational relationship respects the condition of subject of the person who we interact with. We recognise the purpose of interaction, which in a sense turns the other

person or oneself into the object of action. We assume the sense of attention and assistance as a moral demand regarding the subject who we interact with and it is identified as a directive asymmetrical relationship, as a relationship of authority in its full sense and as a relationship of situated and asymmetrical responsibility.

I find it impossible to understand the educational relationship without considering these conditions derived from the criteria of use of common language and from the purpose which allows distinguishing it from other activities. The path of the real definition starts from the analysis of the activities which allow us to preserve the purpose. In this way, apart from discerning, knowing the aspect of something, we define the particular traits of education in order to get to know them in their functioning. Knowing what education is means knowing how to discern, define and understand the concept. This demands going beyond the criterion of common use of the term and the criterion of activity as a purpose to understand the distinctive traits of character of education which determine its real meaning in every educational act.

From the point of view of the pedagogical tradition, we must be sure about what we have to do, how and why to do it. In Dürr's work "Education in freedom", in which he paraphrases what Froebel said in "The Education of Man", he tells us that what we have to do in every complete educational action is a *monitoring action* which cares for and understands the educatee and also an *anticipatory action* which should be determining, prescriptive and demanding; he maintains that both actions identify "maternal love" and "paternal authority" in a special way (Dürr, 1971, p. 25; Froebel, 1999). His own reasoning leads him to say that all the educational action has always revolved around those two pillars which have been translated differently into alternative pairs, with a sense which is not always antinomic and which we identify in this way today: authority-freedom, coercion-freedom, authoritarianism-non-interventionism; freeing-obliging, guiding-letting grow, freedom-arrangement, authority-obedience, freedom-education; preparing for life-living life; task-result, lighting the fire-filling the glass, judge's impartiality-attentive, watchful, caring help from the person who takes care.

The existence of those alternative pairs makes Dürr affirm that the "*pedagogical achievement*" appears as a risk without exception because the "unrepeatable uniqueness of the pedagogical encounter summons the entire man in its "concerning" in such a way that the educator has to accept risk and failure" (Dürr, 1971, p. 30). Professor Ibáñez Martín went deeper into this idea during the opening lesson of the 2010-2011 academic year when he talked in his Faculty about the old and new risks in the educational action with the hope that every student would have "IRIS": *Interest* in learning, *Reflection* on what has been perceived, *Incorporation* of what is provided and *Surmounting* challenges (Ibáñez-Martín, 2010, pp. 24-25).

Undoubtedly, the educational relationship is basically a relationship of freedom and education. It is necessary to admit that all the disagreements which arise from the conjunction of those two terms in the educational relationship, are neither free nor the result of minds which are hypersensitive to pedagogical advice. Common sense makes us think about several real contrasts in the relationship: if freedom demands independence and autonomy and education is a way of influencing people, how do we intend to establish connections between such opposite concepts?

At first sight, the dilemma seems to lead us to a dead end. However, as we will be able to check, the contradiction between these terms only exists when we demand excessively the independent character of freedom or the influential character of education. There is no contradiction, but reciprocity in a correct understanding of both terms. At most, there is a contradictory appearance which is typical of all antinomic approaches if,

against the complexity of the object education, we consider the limitation of both concepts real when they are subject to an internal relationship in an idealistic sense. In this way, increasing one would imply decreasing the other.

In Whitehead's words, the pedagogical tradition maintained that the freedom-education relationship required rhythmical demands of freedom and discipline and a peculiar rhythm that made educators regulate their influence on the educatees' incipient freedom, depending on the level of development of their aptitudes. In this way, he opposes and criticises the naturalistic view which affirmed that a self-perfection discipline which led to moral freedom would arise voluntarily from the educatee's incipient freedom (Whitehead, 1965, p. 56). As Bantock says: "in order to exercise the ability required by freedom, the restriction and discipline essential to the process of becoming free imply the human being's highest freedoms" (Bantock, 1970, p. 67).

It is not a question of joining the mottos "more freedom, less education" or "less freedom, more education", but of assuming realistically that the maximum of freedom requires the maximum of education in each case. As an educatee, I have the freedom that I have in every moment and in order to improve it, it is necessary to receive the best possible education. It is a question of letting educatees use their freedom because they learn by exercising it in their possibilities, that is to say, it is about *educating in freedom*. However, it is also about *educating for freedom* in such a way that the educator leads them to master the necessary requirements to be able to choose starting from the ability which educatees have so as to organize themselves according to their human condition. In short, an *education of freedom* is necessary because educatees acquire competence to act and to decide only when they know their situation and condition and learn to master them by exercising them. The freedom-education relationship is education "of" freedom: it is education "in" freedom and "for" freedom. The terms freedom and education do not exclude each other, they are not antagonistic by meaning although they can be instrumentalised and distorted so that they will look so. The truth is that freedom and education are non-antagonistic terms which demand and need each other. Freedom and education do not oppose each other, they demand each other.

In the educational relationship, "freedom" and 'education' demand each other (Touriñán, 1979). Although the freedom-education relationship is established by considering freedom the first term, this does not mean that the relationship must be considered transitive, but that freedom comes first in this relationship because it belongs to the person and education comes second because it is something that the person receives.

There is no contradiction between the terms of the relationship, just the opposite, there is reciprocity between them. Freedom benefits from education, but education also benefits from freedom. If education is a process which helps individuals so that they can fully accomplish humanity in themselves, education benefits from freedom because, as knowledge advances, we can reject ideas which were considered correct till that time and we can also decide about ways of education which are more appropriate to the human condition and which have to be valued, chosen and accomplished (Yela, 1956, p. 208).

Nevertheless, it is not a question of saying that education demands freedom because it benefits from it and it is an instrument for education. It is rather a question of understanding that freedom and education demand each other at the same level of necessity: freedom is necessary to accomplish education and education is necessary to accomplish freedom.

Some authors have tried to deny the demand of education on the part of freedom. However, this implies saying, against the most elementary common sense, that man cannot improve his freedom or that individuals reach the perfection of their freedom spontaneously: neither our reality obeys us unconditionally, nor we reach the learning of

the demands imposed by our own and other people's reality in each situation without the help from others.

The freedom-education relationship demands to defend *education as a principle of freedom*; freedom comes from education, since it has to be educated and, in this sense, we speak about education *for* freedom and about *freedom as a goal* of education. It is also necessary to defend *freedom as a principle of education*, because education comes from freedom. In education it is necessary to choose and the educatee is a free agent who is educated; without freedom we do not educate, we train and, in this sense, we speak about education *in* freedom and about *freedom as a means* of education (Tourriñán, 1979 and 2014a, cap. 5).

Education is undoubtedly a principle of freedom, because in a way, freedom comes from education: it demands education. Freedom is a principle of education, because education in a way, comes from freedom: it demands freedom.

This is because, by nature, man is *an unfinished being*: his answer is not determined univocally by his structure, he has some needs which do not show him how to satisfy them in an unconditionally efficient way. Man is not born with a pre-established insertion in a way of life, but he necessarily has to decide a way to achieve personal fulfilment. By nature, man is *an incomplete being in a double sense*: he is not born in good conditions to use his aptitudes in a lucid way and he does not learn spontaneously by himself with complete inconsiderateness to the help which others offer him. Moreover, a man is *a limited being*: the human answer not only produces the effects that he wants, but also those which have to be produced, independently of the fact that he thinks about them or wants to take them into account; the answer affects his internal and external reality in each circumstance and in accordance with opportunities.

That means that man, for being the way he is, has freedom in a natural way, in the human way, that is to say, unfinished (he is not finished univocally by his structure, although he does not choose if he lacks impulses), limited (not only the effect that he wants is produced) and incomplete (he is neither born able to use his aptitudes, nor he learns by himself without help from others). As he has incomplete freedom, we can speak about education as a principle of freedom, since we learn to use freedom completely only thanks to education. Precisely because freedom is unfinished we can speak about it as a principle of education, since it is clear that it would lack all chance if man was a mere set of univocally determined reflexes, that is, if man was determined, without the possibility to assume intentionally his life and the kind of existence which he wishes for himself. Moreover, as his freedom is limited, he has to learn to set goals and learn how to achieve them in order to satisfy his needs. Any object does not satisfy each demand of necessity in the same way, since every object has some properties and depending on what they are like, they affect the properties of the demand which we want to satisfy. In this way, the knowledge of those relationships and the real opportunity to achieve them is the way of the concrete educational action.

Freedom demands education as a necessary condition because we have to achieve the lucid habit of the capacity of choice; and education demands freedom as a necessary condition because if educatees were not free, they could not be educated and everything would be determined for the human condition.

Freedom and education demand each other with a logical necessity. This implies that freedom and education do not exclude each other. Although freedom demands independence and education is presented as a way of influencing educatees, we cannot seriously affirm that the educational influence is negative or that the independence demanded by freedom is complete and unconditional.

Before going on, it is necessary to clarify that affirming education as a principle of freedom is not the same as affirming that education gives us freedom. There is no doubt that some have understood it in this way, but obviously, education cannot be understood as a process of creation in a full sense. If man did not have the ability to be able to choose, choice would be impossible since, as we already know, learning to choose properly implies the existence of the faculty of choice. We have to understand that education is an act of creation in an analogical sense, therefore education of freedom does not mean creating freedom, but according to our considerations, it means putting the necessary means so that the educatee will update that feature of the human condition.

It is true that the act of decision implies independence, but the independence which the exercise of freedom demands is not equal to the absence of any kind of help. Obviously, it is not equal to another person's imposition, either. All the field of the pedagogical guidance, or in other words, the field of the educational systematised activity extends between the educatees' gross abandonment when facing reality and their constriction to the educator's expectations. In the pedagogical tradition, the terms freedom and education need mutually and they do not exclude each other.

“Man does not have the animal instinct and he must create his own behaviour plan. However, he needs other people's help because he is not able to do it by himself, as he reaches the world in an immature state” (Kant, 1966, p. 70).

Education for freedom demands education "in" and "of" freedom. The freedom-education relationship demands to raise the educatees' desire to look for right solutions personally and not to bother them with legitimate opinions which must be thoroughly examined and rejected if appropriate. They should not only state the reasons for their invalidity, but also the reasons why they have reached such an opinion (Ibáñez-Martín, 1969, p. 93). This means that the educators' interest in cultivating the educatees' freedom will make them adopt a position of silence, of abstention in some occasions. This is like this, not because they defend neutrality as a motto of education, but because they are conscious that educatees have all the necessary means and conditions to perform a lucid choice in those occasions.

In the same way, the desire to lead students to the proper exercise of freedom will oblige educators to consider the arguments for and against each possible solution in all those educational situations which exceed the educatees' decision-making possibilities. At times they will be obliged to act as impartial referees who decide without favouritism, even if they had preferred the solution to be inclined towards a particular side. Other times they will make emotional expositions in favour of the relationship between a statement and the reality which it expresses. It is all like this because the accomplishment of an act requires fulfilment, interpretation and expression. The procedural strategies which they use are diverse and they always aim at choosing those ways of intervention which guarantee the educatees' capacity to choose their way of life and their position towards values. If this is like this, the basic premise of the teachers' action is the responsible commitment so that students can learn to distinguish among value, assessment, choice, duty, decision, conviction, interpretation and feeling which are produced when performing something. In order to do this, at times they will be the devil's advocates, other times they will be ignorant of the solution to the problem and they will even try to make students see the importance of not taking a stand on something, of abstaining or of making them see their preference as a sense of action and a sense of life. Teachers should always do it through the personal commitment to teach them how to choose by distinguishing value of something from choice of something, whether it is something related to tradition,

innovation, greatness of purposes or dignity, or regarded from the perspective of truth, goodness, beauty or creation.

The true position of the school is the position of committed freedom and responsible activity, since the guarantee of freedom is not the teacher's neutrality, but the respect to the integrity of the students' personality (Weiss, 1967, p. 1). The true position of the school is that which obliges to judge and decide about all the main concepts in man's education so that students may know what they are going to receive from the Institution (Jeffreys, 1955, p. X). It is basically a position that, by rejecting ingenuous concepts of freedom, tries to educate by using freedom as a means and as a goal.


7. The educational relationship is identified with the interaction which we establish to perform the activity of education

The educational relationship is the substantive way of educational intervention, it is its concrete act. The educational relationship is identified with the interaction which we establish to perform the activity of educating and, that is why the educational relationship may be seen as the series of cares which we do to educate. The educational relationship is generically "relationship" and this means that it respects and adjusts to the typical conditions of every relationship. However, as an educational relationship, it differs from the other actions which fulfil the relationship criteria; for this reason we also say that the educational relationship is specifically 'education', which means that it has to respect the criteria of use, purpose and meaning of 'education', if it wants to be so.

In the educational relationship we strengthen the ability to make the educational action and our knowledge of such an activity compatible with the aim of answering the question *what activities count to educate and what counts in the educational activities* in every concrete educational action. In order to do so, we have to choose and value according to the knowledge which we have of the educational action, since 'education' has a meaning of its own.

Consequently, I see the educational relationship as an interactive relationship which we establish to perform the activity of educating, as reflected in Chart 5

Chart 5: Educational relationship as an interaction to educate



Source: Touriñán, 2014a, p. 394.

The complex vision of human reality does not adjust to two mental realms, that of the heart and that of the mind, despite the attraction power which certain expressions may have, for example “they educate by addressing only to what people have above their neck” or “there are people who only think with their heart” or “they think only below their waist”. Mottos, metaphors and antinomic thinking have to be accepted in their limitations of meaning, logically they do not substitute the definition and that is precisely why every position linked to complexity cannot be limited to these two concepts of heart and mind. From the complexity point of view, if we keep the comparison, we should talk about affective intelligence, volitive intelligence, operational intelligence, projective intelligence, symbolising intelligence and reasoning intelligence, since they are intelligence applications to the real and different dimensions of our internal activity which require good management in each case. Reducing the discourse to the concept of emotional intelligence implies limiting the meaning of affective education to that of emotional education and if we assume that emotion and feeling are not the same, emotional education is not a synonym of affective education, since feeling includes affection, value and expectations (Touriñán, 2014a). From the perspective of Pedagogy as knowledge of education and from the perspective of education as a field of reality with intrinsic signification in its terms, we are obliged to preserve intellectual education, affective education, volitive education, operational education, projective education and the creative (interpretative-mental-symbolising-creating) education as dimensional spaces of intervention. They do not get mixed up and respond to different human dimensions of internal common activities, to adjusted competences, to specific capacities, to basic dispositions, to knowledge, skills, attitudes and fundamental habits of development and specific purposes.

8. The relationship demands to systematise traits of character which determine the meaning of ‘education’

As I have already said in epigraph 2, the educational relationship is such, providing that it fulfils the criteria of common use of the term ‘education’ and preserves the purpose to educate, otherwise, it will be another kind of relationship. The educational relationship needs the synonymic relationship, but the former must be analysed with its features, as it corresponds to the real definition of any term. This demands to go beyond the criterion of common use of the term and the criterion of activity as a purpose so as to understand the distinctive traits which determine its real meaning in every educational act.

Distinguishing what makes a relationship be educational demands the pedagogical assessment of several ways of behaviour, taking into account not only criteria of use and purpose, but also criteria of meaning which are internal to the concept itself. Basically, we have to build the thought which allows us to justify that the educational activity is “educational” because 1) it adjusts to the criteria of use of the term, 2) it fulfils the purpose of educating in its activities and 3) it adjusts to the real meaning of that action, that is to say, it adjusts to its own traits of character and sense, the same as any other identity which is defined and is comprehensible.

Character is the distinctive trait or set of features which determine something as what it is. The character of education is its determination, what determines it, which arises from the objectual complexity of education and which demands to solve the relationships among value, choice, duty, decision, feeling, thought and creation, which are characteristic of man's internal common activity in every concrete case of performance.

Character, the set of features which determine the meaning of education, is related to the objectual complexity of education. *Objectual complexity* is the quality of pedagogical intervention which makes us keep realistically the connection of the individual, social, historical and species-being human condition with the object ‘education’, and take into account its own characteristics, whose relationships make it possible to identify its internal (character) determining traits and face each intervention as knowledge and action and as a link among value, election, duty, decision, feeling, thought and creation. The relationships established among these elements make it possible to identify the internal (character) determining traits of education (Tourriñán, 2014a, 2014c).

For me, the complexity of the object of knowledge ‘education’ arises from the diversity of man's activity in the educational action: we intervene by means of the activity to achieve educated activity, which means that we go from knowledge to action to form the individual, social, historical and species-being human condition, taking into account the features of the object ‘education’, which make it possible to identify its internal (character) determining traits. The activity is the central pillar of the complexity of the object ‘education’.

In my opinion, it is possible to systematise the complexity of the object ‘education’ from three axes which determine the character traits of education:

- The founding condition of values in education.
- The double condition of agent-author and agent-actor of each subject concerning his/her education.
- The double condition of field of knowledge and of action for education.

Regarding the first condition, we must say that education lacks intelligible justification when the founding character of values is rejected. As we all do not have to be the same in life necessarily, we infer that each one will only decide to fulfil him/herself in a concrete way, when s/he finds it possible to reveal the value of that specific way to carry it out, with his/her capacity and with the help from others. Besides, as man is neither born

perfect, nor he reaches the perfection which is typical of him spontaneously, he will not understand correctly the value of fulfilling himself in such a concrete way unless education provides the appropriate means so that he can build up the ability of lucid choice. This relationship between education and values makes the education in values be an inexorable need. Education is always education in values and choice of values and although any type of influence is not education, any type of influence may be transformed into a process of educational influence. We have to know, appreciate and choose values; education is a value itself, it teaches values and when we educate, we choose values because we set goals, and aims are chosen values. We responsibly give them a sense of action from the resolution of *the means-end relationship*. From the perspective of linking means and ends, the educational relationship acquires axiological character through the founding condition of value and it is necessarily understood as education in values for the construction of processes and operative habits of choice which materialise in the creation of responsible sense of action.

The founding condition of value makes the object of knowledge 'education' be the way it is: chosen values. From the perspective of value, education involves a *value-choice relationship*, because we build aims and this means that we have to develop *operative habits* which allow us to connect the things that we choose and arrange them as means and aims. It is necessary to achieve operative habits, which are connected to the *sense of responsible action*, in each educatee. *Responsibility and sense of action are principles of education related to its axiological character.*

By means of the first condition, education acquires axiological character. *Axiological character* means that education is always education in values and choice of values and although any type of influence is not education, any type of influence can be changed into a process of educational influence. In each action we set goals, which are chosen values and we give them a responsible sense of action from the resolution of the means-aims relationship. Values are eligible, because we set goals which are chosen values. In this way, *the axiological character determines education as a construction of processes, of a means-aims relationship.*

Concerning the second condition, we have to say that the meaning of agent marks a trait of character in education which cannot be avoided, at the risk of renouncing to educate. We always think about educational relationship as a relationship between two, but the truth is that it is, in an unmistakable way, a relationship of one with oneself. In the educational relationship each of us are *agents-actors* who let ourselves be guided and obey those people who work as educators. We perform a lot of operations because we are guided to be educated. Besides, we are *agents-authors* because we guide ourselves in processes of education by deciding our goals and integrating our acts into our projects. By means of education we undertake the task to be actors and authors in our projects, even if our decision is to act as we are told. *In each case, as agents, we are destined by education to undertake the task of being authors and actors of our own projects.*

From the agents' perspective, the peculiarity of the educational action does not lie in the fact that the agents are one or two, but in the unquestionable truth that each person is, in a way, the agent -actor and author- of his/her own development and therefore we have to achieve *volitive habits* in educatees so that they may want things and engage in them by forcing themselves, and *projective habits*, which allow them to integrate things into their projects by identifying themselves with them and setting goals. Volitive habits relate to the personal commitment and projective habits relate to the sense of life. That is to say that I educate so that educatees can educate themselves and can decide and develop their life project and formation. We not only operate (we choose to do things, perform operations, act), but we also force us (voluntary commitment) and project (do projects,

decide to act). In the educational relationship, educatees are also the subjects of their education, so they have to find the control of their own life by developing the patrimonial sense of their individual, social, historical and species-being human condition. I set goals, but I also force myself and control my choice autonomously by deciding the actions from my decided project, even if my decided project is to do what I am told. From the agents' point of view, education is made up of personal and patrimonial character and demands to understand the value-duty and value-decision relationship, since volitive and projective habits, together with the operative habit, have a place in the educational action (Ferrater, 1979, pp. 119-155; Dearden, Hirst, Peters, 1982).

By means of the second condition, education acquires personal and patrimonial character. The *personal character* of education means that the educational action respects the educatees' condition of agents. It prepares them to engage and force themselves personally (it is the genuine origin of their choice), in a voluntary way, in their performances and to invent or create original-singular ways (that arise in them and from them) of carrying out existence, by facing their human condition (individual, social, historical and species-being) with autonomy and responsibility, inside the shared space of a culture, and getting away from the repetition or cloning of pre-established models (Arendt, 1974; Damasio, 2010; Gervilla, 2000, Haidt, 2006; Marina, 2009; Morin, 2009; Pinker, 2011; Mosterín 2008; Touriñán, 2013a). Apart from operative habits, we need volitive habits of commitment and personal obligation to the action. This marks the personal sense of education as an original and natural commitment, that is to say, born from oneself towards their education, which should not be seen away from the existence of the other person and the other thing in each intervention. We are obliged to be actors and authors in the educational action regarding oneself, the other person and the other thing. We voluntarily commit ourselves with values in order to fulfil rules and norms. *Commitment and the origin of action in the person who is an agent are principles of education related to personal character.*

Patrimonial character means that when we set goals, we not only consider their value, but we also include that value in the aim as an integrating part of our life project; we create our own patrimony out of ourselves. *Identity, individualisation and the sense of our life are principles of education related to the patrimonial character.* Affirming the patrimonial character of education means that each of us is a patrimony; that we learn to choose, to engage and to set our goals so as to be able to determine our life project by giving an answer to our needs in each circumstance: we build ourselves as our most characteristic patrimony. Deciding which of our needs has to be dealt with in our life project, here and now, implies deliberating and assuming by taking into account the knowledge, values, feelings, attitudes and interests that we have in that moment; a patrimony that we will be able to correct and vary thanks to the opportunities, the circumstances and the education received, but that we cannot avoid having in the moment we take the decision (Touriñán, 2006). *Patrimonial character defines education as the setting of goals and the building of personal projects. The purpose turns into a goal because it integrates into our projects.*

Concerning the third condition, it is assumed that I can choose to do something, I can engage with that 'something' and I can even decide to integrate that 'something' as part of my projects, but then I must carry it out it, I must go from thought to action, I must go from the attained and attainable value to the effective accomplishment. Through the third condition, it is necessary to insist on the fact that education is a field of reality which is susceptible of knowledge and an action which is performed by means of the educational relationship. It could be said then that both methods of thinking and methods of action are advisable for education, in the most classic and universal sense of methods of theoretical

and practical rationality (Mosterín, 2008b). This double condition identifies the complexity of the educational action for the pedagogical knowledge, which has to solve the theory-practice relationship in each case: I must go from thought and knowledge to action. Knowing, choosing, engaging and deciding is not enough for this; it is necessary to take one more step and *feel*, that is to say, relate affection, value and personal expectations so that we can achieve *feeling in the form of positive relation of attachment towards the value of what has been achieved or of what we want to achieve. The effective performance of the action demands execution, interpretation and expression.*

To make this possible we have to achieve *affective integration*, as we express ourselves with the feelings that we have in each particular situation and we relate what we want to attain to specific values in an affective way by means of positive attachment. However, we also need *cognitive integration* which relates ideas and beliefs to our expectations and convictions so that we can articulate thought and believed values with reality, because through rationality, our action is based on knowledge in an explicit way. In addition, we need *creative integration*, that is, we must give meaning to our acts by means of symbols, since each act which we perform requires an interpretation of the situation as a whole and in relation to the set of our actions and projects inside our cultural context: we build culture by using symbols.

In order to carry out the action, the operative, volitive and projective habits demand the *affective habit* which derives from the value-feeling relationship and generates *heartfelt experience of value*. We go from sensitivity to feeling and we relate what we want to do to what is valuable with positive attachment. We need affective habits, but the specific realisation of the action is not possible without the *intellectual habit* or without the *creative, symbolising-creating, habit*.

The agents' personal qualities give character to the intervention, as a specific and singular "*mise-en-scène*", because people cannot stop having the values and the feelings which they have in each specific situation. That personal and singular sense puts us in a position to understand that the educational action forces to assume the value-feeling relationship and it offers us not only a theoretical and practical perspective, but also an intrinsic artistic and aesthetic perspective.

By means of feeling we express the state of mind which has been produced; depending on the fulfilment of our expectations in the action, we manifest and we expect *recognition* for our choice; we manifest and we expect *acceptance* of our voluntary commitment; we manifest and we expect *reception* to our projects and manifest *devotion* to them. Choosing, engaging, deciding and feeling a value positively has its affective manifestation in *attitudes of recognition, acceptance, reception and devotion to the action*. What characterises attitude is its condition of significant experience of learning born from the affective assessment of the positive or negative results in the achievement of a particular behaviour.

By means of the third condition education acquires integral, gnoseological and spiritual character. *Integral character* means dimensional integrated development of educatees from their internal common activity: think, feel affectively, want, choose- do (operate), decide-act (project) and create (build through symbols) in order to develop the individual, social, historical and species-being human condition with possibilities of success in the situations that may arise in all the spheres of life: personal, family, local, school, professional, etc. *The integral character* of education means education of educatees as a whole from their internal activity, not as a sum of all their parts. The positive connection of attachment and the agent's involvement as a whole make *positivity and dimensional development be principles of education derived from its integral character*.

From the perspective of the integral character of education, we can say that all education is intellectual, but not everything in education is intelligence education; there are other educable dimensions of intervention which can be dealt with specifically. The same can be said about each of the other dimensions of intervention: all education is affective, but not everything in education is education of affectivity; all education is volitive, but not everything in education is education of will; all education is operative, but not everything in education is education of the capacity to act-do; all education is projective, but not everything in education is education of the capacity to decide morally; all education is notative, symbolizing, creating and awareness-raising, but not everything in education is education of spirituality, of mental corporality, of conscience, of significant apprehension or of creativity.


From the pedagogical point of view, the integral educational action connects *intelligence* (cognition and reasoning), *affectivity and emotions* (dimensioned feeling), *volition* (want something with determination and commitment), *operation and projection* (sense of action and sense of life, construction of processes and setting of goals), *creation* (construction of culture by symbolising) of developing people and *contextual variables* that allow us to form a “coordinated whole” between values, thoughts, feelings, duties, choices, decisions and creations. All the dimensions take part in each case and education is not solved by dealing with only one of them.

Gnoseological character means that we are capable of cognitive integration, that is, that we learn to relate ideas and beliefs by using ways of thinking so that we can articulate thought and believed values with reality by means of knowledge and rationality in each of our choices, volitions, projects, feelings, thoughts and creative interpretations. *The cognitive integration is a principle of education derived from the gnoseological character.*

Spiritual character means that we generate consciousness and creativity, which makes it possible to create symbols from the human condition itself to note and signify the self, the other person and the other thing in the physical world, in the world of mental states and in the world of the contents of thought and its products. *The spiritual character* of education means that education is carried out in the human way and it generates mental events in educatees; we improve our self-awareness and reality awareness by means of symbols, in the human way, that is to say, as a mental corporality which integrates the mental and the physical and establishes a form of creative relationship between the self, the other person and the other thing, by means of symbols. *Spiritual character* means that we can build culture, that is to say, we can build by using symbols. *The creative (symbolising-creating) integration is a principle of education related to the spiritual character.*

For me, education can be defined taking into account traits of character that determine the meaning of education. Nothing is education if it does not fulfil the conditions of common use, purpose and traits of character. All educational action differs from the others because of the common use and the activity, but it is also singularised if we attend to criteria of real definition because the traits of character that determine meaning are attributed to the educational action through the objectual complexity of education. Thus, we can say that all educational action has an axiological, personal, patrimonial, integral, gnoseological and spiritual character, as summarised in Chart 6.

Chart 6: Character of the education derived from the objectual complexity of ‘education’



Source: Touriñán, 2014a, p. 645.


9. The educational relationship demands agreement between values and feelings when moving from knowledge to action

I can choose to do something, I can engage with that ‘something’ and I can even decide to integrate that ‘something’ as part of my projects, but then I must accomplish it, I must go from thought to action, I must go from attained and attainable value to effective accomplishment. This implies execution, interpretation and expression. There is not education without affectivity, that is to say, without facing the problem of generating

heartfelt experience of value. We need operative, volitive, projective, affective, cognitive and creative habits for this. The effective accomplishment of the action requires operative, volitive and projective habits, but we also need affective, cognitive and creative habits. Only in this way we accomplish the action, which always implies execution, interpretation and expression (cognitive, symbolising-creating and affective integration)

By means of feeling we express the state of mind which has been produced; depending on the fulfilment of our expectations in the action, we manifest and we expect *recognition* for our choice; we manifest and we expect *acceptance* of our voluntary commitment; we manifest and we expect *reception* to our projects and manifest *devotion* to them. Choosing, engaging, deciding and feeling a value positively has its affective manifestation of connection and attachment in *attitudes of recognition, acceptance, reception and devotion to the action*. What characterises attitude is its condition of significant experience of learning born from the affective assessment of the positive or negative results in the achievement of a particular behaviour. We reflect it in Chart 7 in the form of the complex relationship of value-educatees' internal common activity, by making values and feelings agree when moving from knowledge to action.

Chart 7: Value-feeling agreement when moving from knowledge to action



Source: Touriñán, 2014a, p. 356.

Counting on the opportunities, we reach the concrete fulfilment of a value but we always have to make use of operative, volitive, projective, affective habits and notative-signifying, creating habits. Whenever we carry out something we think, feel, want, choose to do, decide projects and create with symbols. Only in this way can we reach the concrete fulfilment of something, which always implies choosing processes, forcing oneself (engaging voluntarily), deciding goals and projects (according to the opportunities and in

each circumstance), feeling (integrating affectively), thinking (integrating cognitively) and creating culture (integrating creatively by giving meaning through symbols).

Only in this way can we reach the fulfilment of an action as an author agent, according to the opportunities and in each circumstance. *The effective accomplishment of the action demands execution, interpretation and expression.* To make this possible, apart from making an *affective integration*, we express ourselves with the feelings which we have in every concrete situation and we relate what we want to achieve to specific values affectively through positive attachment. We need to do *cognitive integration* by relating ideas and beliefs to our expectations and convictions so that we can articulate thought and believed values with reality because our action is explicitly based on knowledge through rationality. We also need to make a *creative (symbolising-creating) integration*, that is to say, we must give meaning to our acts by means of symbols, since every act that we perform requires the interpretation of the situation as a whole and in the entirety of our actions and projects within our cultural context. *Creative integration* articulates values and creations by relating the physical and the mental to build up culture through symbols.

If our reasonings are correct, the double condition of knowledge and action puts us in the integral vision of the complexity of action. In order to perform the action, the operative, volitive and projective habits demand the affective habit which derives from the value-feeling relationship and generates heartfelt experience of value. However, the accomplishment of value is not possible in its concrete fulfilment, expression and interpretation if we do not make an affective, cognitive and creating integration in every action according to the opportunities and in each circumstance.

From the perspective of the change from knowledge to action, in every performance we follow a two-way path which allows us to go:

- From choice, duty and decision to affectivity and vice versa.
- From affectivity to cognition and creativity and vice versa.
- From cognition, affectivity and creativity to aesthetics and vice versa.

Creativity and affectivity are related by means of attitudes towards innovation and heartfelt experiences of emotion and value; creativity provokes us singular feelings and feelings promote or inhibit creativity. Cognition and creativity are related by the possibility of generating a higher cognitive integration in every apprehension of innovative reality; we use cognition to interpret, signify and innovate. Cognition and affectivity are related because we are conscious and thinking affectivities: we relate ideas and beliefs and generate convictions about what we choose, what engages us and what we decide and feel, reaching in this way heartfelt experience of what is valuable, of reality, of our acts and of our thoughts. Cognition, creativity and affectivity are related to aesthetics because we are able to make interpretations and attribute meaning to beauty as harmony or relationship among forms, generating heartfelt experience of that relationship. In the articulation of action we are able to move from sensitivity to feeling and from cognition and affectivity to creativity and aesthetics in every act.

Each case of intervention is an exercise of freedom, commitment, decision, passion and compassion; each case of pedagogical action demands to solve the agreement between values and feelings in every situation as an explicit manifestation of recognition attitudes, acceptance, reception and devotion to the educational action. However, moving from knowledge to action is not completely solved because it also demands *reason and creation*: every case of intervention is a “mise-en-scène” whose fulfilment implies, according to the opportunities and in each circumstance, execution, interpretation and expression, which also demand cognitive integration and symbolising-creating integration.

Each performance is a path which implies thought and believed value, created, symbolised and signified value, chosen value, committed value, decided value and felt

value. Moving from knowledge to action settles us in the complexity of the attained value, the attainable value and the attainment of value. The educational relationship acquires axiological, personal and patrimonial character and also integral, gnoseological and spiritual character.

Within the framework I have just described, I would like to talk in this article about the educational relationship as a concrete act. Not as a question of *educability* which would lead us to enumerate the human capacities which make it possible to receive education, or as a question of *educativity* which would lead us to enumerate competences which make it viable for a subject to be able to give education. Obviously it is not a question of formal and real freedoms which guarantee *the opportunity to educate* in a legally determined territory which constitutes the institutional form to approach the relationship between justice and care. I want to deliberate on the concept of “educational relationship” which joins educability, educativity and opportunity to educate in an only act and I want to deliberate on that concept by cultivating an independent reflection, as Herbart would say. The result of my thoughts about that question is what I intend to offer. My approach is the following:

- Educational relationship is the substantive form of educational intervention, it is its concrete act. It is identified with the interaction which we establish to perform the activity of educating and, precisely for this reason, it may be seen as the set of cares which we do to educate.
- In the educational relationship we strengthen the ability to make the action of educating and our knowledge of it compatible in order to answer the question *what activities count to educate and what counts in the educational activities* in every concrete educational action. To achieve this we have to choose and value according to the knowledge which we have about the educational action, since ‘education’ has a meaning of its own.

Therefore, I see educational relationship as the exercise of education and it implies assuming the complexity of education, which I have systematised in a triple conditional axis: values, actor and author agent and the concurrence of knowledge and action. This triple condition must be fulfilled in each concrete case of the educational relationship because complexity establishes the traits that determine the meaning of “educational”, which allow singularising the relationship with respect to other types of relationships. If those traits of meaning which characterise ‘education’ are not fulfilled, the educational relationship will be generically relationship, but it will not be able to be specifically educational because it would not manage to be characterised against other relationships. We must assume that:

- a connection between value and choice is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we can improve the responsible sense of action, in accordance to the axiological character of education.
- a connection between value and duty is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we can improve the voluntary commitment of action, in accordance to the personal character of education.
- a connection between value and decision is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we can improve the individualised sense of life which that action has, in accordance to the patrimonial character of education.
- a connection of attachment or dependence is created between value and feeling in the educational relationship in such a way that we can orient

ourselves towards the achievement of heartfelt experience of value by means of affective integration, in accordance to the integral character of education.

- a connection between ideas and beliefs with expectations and convictions is created in the educational relationship, by means of ways of thinking, in such a way that we are able to integrate thought and believed values with reality cognitively, in accordance to the gnoseological character of education.
- a connection between signs and meanings is created in the educational relationship due to the human relationship of the mental and the physical, in such a way that we are able to make a symbolising-creating integration of value and give it meaning, in accordance to the spiritual character of education.

Each of these connections which are established in man's internal common activity generates and leads to a trait of character which determines the educational relationship against any other type of relationships. Character is a demand of the real definition; the objectual complexity of education originates its character through the internal common activity and the educational relationship must fulfil those demands according to the principle of meaning: nothing is educational if it does not have the specified traits of the character of education; only in this way will the relationship be educational. Therefore, the educational relationship is interaction to educate and it implies assuming the complexity of education and the demands derived from the traits of character of education, as I have specified in the previous epigraph.

10. Final considerations: the educational relationship is not neutral; it is a committed, responsible and compassionate relationship

The educational relationship is “educational” because its aim is educating and it adjusts to the meaning of that action. However, coexisting, communicating and caring are relationships prior to the educational relationships which establish necessary, but not sufficient conditions. *The educational relationship is generically relationship and it is specifically educational.* The educational relationship is a concept with own meaning, connected with the character of education, and it requires agreement between values and feelings in each interaction.

The triple condition derived from the consideration of values, agents and educational action marks the objectual complexity of ‘education’. If that complexity is respected, it makes it possible to understand the knowledge of the educational relationship without renouncing to the traits derived from complexity which determine the meaning of “educational” in the relationship, by singularising it in relation to other types of relationships.

I reiterate that the educational relationship is not basically a problem of teaching, since it can be used to educate or it cannot, or a problem of knowledge which can be separated from action. The educational relationship is basically a problem of knowledge and action related to the meaning of education in each field which has been built to intervene. In my opinion, all this *makes the educational relationship not be completely understood if it is not interpreted as an exercise of committed freedom and as a responsible activity.*

The neutrality of the task does not exist. If the relationship which we establish is educational, *we have to engage* and defend the meaning of education in every space of intervention categorised as field of education. In this case, we exert a *responsible activity*

because we care to educate, that is to say, to make educators, together with educatees, generate the educational relationship in educatees in relation to themselves, in such a way that they are not only actors, but also authors of their own life project wherever they can, in each created field of intervention:

- a connection between value and choice is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we can establish the responsible sense of action by building processes from the means-ends relationship.
- a connection between value and duty is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we establish the personal commitment of action.
- a connection between value and decision is created in the educational relationship in such a way that we can establish the individualised sense of life which is intended in that action by building goals.
- a connection of attachment or dependence is created between value and feeling in the educational relationship in such a way that we speak about heartfelt experience of value as affective integration.
- a connection between ideas and beliefs with expectations and convictions is created in the educational relationship by means of ways of thinking, in such a way that we are able to integrate thought and believed values with reality in a cognitive way.
- a connection between signs and meanings is created in the educational relationship due to the human relationship of the mental and the physical, in such a way that we are able to make a symbolising-creating integration and give meaning to the human condition in the symbolised world by building culture.

The educational relationship has a singular and specific sense through its agents' personal qualities. Each case of intervention is an exercise of freedom, commitment, decision, passion, compassion, reason and creation in which the heartfelt experience of the concrete action relates values and feelings. Thus, the fulfilment of the action has to create its specific sense in the fulfilment process through the agents' personal qualities, who cannot avoid having the values and feelings which they have in every concrete situation. In the educational relationship we manage educational fields and we manage each of the relationships derived from the objectual complexity of education in each field.

The educational relationship is not a question of educability or educativity, or opportunity to educate, but all that in a concrete action. As a concrete action, it is defined in its own terms, which are established through the founding condition of value, the double condition of agent and the double consideration of knowledge and action for the object 'education'. Through the objectual complexity of 'education' we assume that the educational relationship responds to real defined traits of axiological, personal, patrimonial, integral, gnoseological and spiritual character.

The way to accept responsibility for the educational relationship and to engage with it pedagogically, marks a deep sense of education, also far from the fundamentalist threat of indoctrination, from the antipedagogical illusion of neutralism and from the instrumentalising proposal of manipulation, and the intimidatory coercion, mistakes which are always possible, but avoidable in education. When one educates, there is a directive relationship of authority based on the confidence that a person gives to another to orient their behaviours in a specific field of their existence -in this case, educatees-, who are guided by means of responsible activity to do what they must, to obey and to undertake the task of being actors and authors of their own projects.

Basically, the educational relationship is “educational” because it fulfils the criteria of use of common language for education, its aim is to educate and it adjusts to the meaning of that action. In the educational relationship we interact to perform the activity of educating, and to achieve it, we care, teach, coexist, communicate and mediate, but always with the present aim of educating, that is to say, of fulfilling the conditions of meaning of that concept in every concrete educational action. All this makes the educational relationship be an exercise of committed freedom and a responsible and compassionate activity which is exerted in every concrete educational action.

Something has changed and something remains in the pedagogical debate concerning questions which affect the freedom-education relationship. The true stance of the school is the stance of committed freedom and responsible activity, since the guarantee of freedom is not the teacher's neutrality, but the respect to the integrity of the educatees' personality: subjects who think, have feelings, engage, choose to act, decide projects and create symbols to signify reality and culture from their human condition as actor and author agents. *From the perspective of the educational relationship, education is education of intelligence, will, affectivity, construction of processes delimited in means and ends, setting of goals and decided projects and the construction of culture.* That is what corresponds to the internal common activities and the general dimensions of intervention related to them.

In education in general, each act of fulfilment of value implies moving from knowledge to action, which means that, taking into account the opportunities and the resources available, we have to execute, interpret and express. When we choose purposes, not only do we estimate value, but we also assume that value in the purpose as an integrating part of our life project and we feel it; we create our own patrimony out of ourselves and we identify with the decisions that we take with positive feelings towards and from that identification. We act with freedom, determination and decision and we make affective, cognitive and symbolising-creating integration. We articulate thought and believed values with reality by means of knowledge and rationality. We establish a creating relationship among the self, the other person and the other thing, by creating culture and symbols to note and signify reality through the human condition itself and we express the different level of commitment with ourselves, the other person and the other thing by means of the complex relationship between values and the educatee's internal common activity. By means of feeling we express the state of mind which has been produced due to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of our expectations in the action; we manifest and we expect *recognition* for our choice; we manifest and we expect *acceptance* of our voluntary commitment; we manifest and we expect *reception* to our projects and manifest *devotion* to them. Choosing, engaging, deciding and feeling a value positively has its affective manifestation in attitudes of recognition, acceptance, reception and devotion to the action, which always demands cognitive and creating integration. Regarding the educational relationship, *freedom and compassion are principles of intervention*: we choose and have feelings towards ourselves, the other people and the other things: we have to *sympathise*, feel with ourselves, the other person and the other thing in each choice, through our human condition. Depriving ourselves of it implies depriving of a basic, integrating part of man's internal common activity, which manifests itself in the human condition, whether we want it or not.

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